PENGHUJAHAN BERTULIS KES SAMAN TRAFIK DI BAWAH KAEDAH 8(1) LN 166/59

DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUANTAN

DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR

No. Kes Mahkamah: 86-XXXX-12/10

Pendakwa Raya

Lwn

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PENGHUJAHAN BERTULIS ORANG KENA SAMAN

MUQADIMAH

A- Puan Majistret Yang Bijaksana,

Orang Kena Saman telah didakwa atas Kaedah 8(1) LN 166/59 [TAB A] yang berbunyi “At an intersection where the road is marked into 3 traffic lanes, the nearside lane shall be used only by vehicles turning left, the centre lane shall be used only by vehicles travelling straight ahead, and the offside lane shall be used only by vehicles turning right.”

Ironinya, P5 & P5(k) iaitu rajah kasar dan kunci menunjukkan bahawa jalan yang menjadi isu hanya mempunyai 2 lorong bukannya 3 lorong, sepatutnya OKS di dakwa atas Kaedah 8(2) LN 166/59 [TAB A] yang berbunyi “At an intersection where the road is marked into 2 traffic lanes, the nearside lane shall be used only for vehicles turning left or travelling straight ahead, and the offside lane shall be used only for vehicles turning right.”

Pihak pendakwa telah mengemukakan empat saksi. Hanya seorang saksi mata iaitu SP4 yang terlibat dalam kemalangan. Ketiga-tiga saksi lain hanya ke tempat kejadian setelah repot pertama di buat. Pegawai Penyiasat (SP3) gagal mengambil keterangan bertulis di bawah Seksyen 112 Akta 593. Beliau kendalikan kes sebanyak 10 hingga 20 kes sehari. Adalah mustahil beliau ingat dengan tepat setiap kes yang disiasatnya lebih-lebih lagi selepas 6 bulan kejadian kemalangan berlaku, tanpa merekodkannya secara bertulis. Ini dapat dilihat dari keteranggannya yang bercanggah berkenaan dengan ‘signboard’ yang dilanggar oleh kenderaan yang terlibat dalam kemalangan ini sebagaimana yang diberi keterangan oleh saksi Pendakwa Raya sendiri iaitu SP4.

SP3 sendiri di dalam pemeriksaan balas memberi keterangan – Saya tidak ada di tempat kejadian ketika berlaku kemalangan.

PENGHUJAHAN

B- Yang Bijaksana Puan Majistret,

Berikut adalah penghujahan kami diperingkat akhir kes pendakwaan. Kami berhujah bahawa prosedur yang terpakai adalah Section 180 Criminal Procedure Code (Act 593) [TAB B]:

Procedure after conclusion of case for prosecution.

(1) When the case for the prosecution is concluded, the Court shall consider whether the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the accused.

(2) If the Court finds that the prosecution has not made out a prima facie case against the accused, the Court shall record an order of acquittal.

(3) If the Court finds a prima facie case has been made out against the accused on the offence charged the Court shall call upon the accused to enter his defence.

(4) For the purpose of this section, a prima facie case is made out against the accused where the prosecution has adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction.

PENTING: Adalah jelas bahawa pihak pendakwaan harus mengemukakan satu kes yang menepati standard prima facie. Standard prima facie ini dijelaskan dalam sub-seksyen (4) Seksyen 180 iaitu (1) credible evidence (2) proving each ingredient of the offence (3) if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction.

Kami merujuk kepada otoriti-otoriti ini:
Di dalam kes Pendakwa Raya v Radin Irwan Iskandar Bin Isagani [2017] MLJU 91 [TAB C] Yang Arif DATO’ HJ. MOHAMAD SHARIFF BIN HJ. ABU SAMAH PK memutuskan:

“Beban dan Tahap Pembuktian di Akhir kes Pendakwaan

[22] Di akhir kes Pendakwaan, adalah menjadi tugas dan beban pembuktian statutory kepada pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan suatu kes “Prima Facie” menurut peruntukan Seksyen 180 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah yang mana membuktikan kesemua elemen-elemen perundangan sebelum Tertuduh dipanggil untuk menjawa pertuduhan terhadapnya.

Section 180 Criminal Procedure Code
. (1) When the case for the Prosecution is concluded, the court shall consider whether the Prosecution has made out a Prima Facie case against the accused’ �

. (2) If the court finds a Prima Facie case has not been made out against the accused, the court shall record an order of acquittal; �

. (3) If the court finds a Prima Facie case has been made out against the accused on the offence charged the court shall call upon the accused to enter his defence �

Justeru itu, samada Tertuduh itu dilepaskan dan dibebaskan ataupun dipanggil untuk Pembelaan di Akhir kes Pendakwaan adalah meliputi makna frasa kes “prima facie”. Suatu kes: “Prima Facie” telah dinyatakan secara tegas dalam kes: Balachandran v. PP (2004) 2 MLRA 547,; (2005) 2 MLJ 301, Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan:
“A prima facie case is therefore one that is sufficient for the accused to called upon to answer. This in turn means that the evidence adduced must be such that it can be overthrown only by evidence in rebuttal. The phrase ‘prima facie case’ is defined in similar terms in Mozley and Whiteley’s Law Dictionary 11th Ed as :

A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favour is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. a prima facie case, then is one which is established by sufficient evidence, and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced by the other side……….In order to make a finding

Page 9
either way the court must, at the close of the case for the prosecution, undertake a positive evaluation of the credibility and reliability of all the evidence adduced so as to determine whether the elements ot the offence have been established. As the trial is without a jury it is only with such a positive evaluation can the court make a determination for the purpose of s 180(2) and (3). Of course in a jury trial where the evaluation is hypothetical the question to be asked would be whether on the evidence as it stands the accused could (and not must) lawfully be convicted. That is so because a determination on facts is matter of ultimate decision by the jury at the end of the trial. Since the court, in ruling that a prima facie case has been made out, must be satisfied that if it is not rebutted is must prevail.

Thus if the accused elects to remain silent be must be convicted. The test at the close of the case for the prosecution would therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facie case has been made out. This must, as of necessity, require a consideration of the existence of any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution. If there is any such doubt there can be no prima facie case. As the accused can be convicted on the prima facie evidence it must have reached a standard which is capable of supporting a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

However it must be observed that it cannot, at that stage, be properly described as a case that has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt involves two aspects. While one is the legal burden on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Both these burdens can only be fully discharged at the end of the whole case when the defence has closed its case. Therefore a case can be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt only at the conclusion of the trial upon a consideration of all the evidence adduced as provided by s 182A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

[23] Dalam memastikan samada kesemua elemen-elemen kesalahan tersebut telah dibuktikan, Mahkamah perlulah mengambil pertimbangan secara positif mengenai kredibiliti dan kebolehterimaan keterangan-keterangan yangvdikemukakan. Dalam keadaan yang sedemikian, mahkamah perlulah membuat suatu penilaian yang maksima keterangan-keterangan kes pendakwaan. Dalam kes: Looi Kow Chai & Anor v. Public Prosecutor (2002) 2 MLRA 383,; (2003) 1 MLJ 65 at 81 (E-F) (MR), Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan bahawa:

“It is therefore follows that there in only once exercise that a judge sitting alone under Section 180 of the Code has to undertake at the close of Prosecution case. He, must subject the Prosecution evidence to the maximum evaluation and to ask himself the question, if decide to call upon the accused to enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am I prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence contained in the Prosecution case? If the answer is in negative then no prima facie case has been made out and the Accused would be entitled to an acquittal”……

Dalam kes: Public Prosecutor v. Ong Cheng Heong (1998) 2 MLRH 345,; (1998) 6 MLJ 678 at 691, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menerangkan “pendekatan” yang perlu diambil menurut Seksyen 173(f) dan180 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah di akhir kes pendakwaan. Begitu juga dalam kes: Pendakwa Raya v. Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar (2005) 2 MLRA 590,; (2006) 6 CLJ 465 (FC), yang mana Mahkamah Persekutuan juga turut menerima ujian-ujian yang dibentangkan dan dipersetujui oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes: Looi Kow Chai diatas.

[24] Secara ringkasnya, apa yang dinyatakan dalam kes-kes diatas adalah seperti berikut:
(i) the close of Prosecution’s case, subject to the evidence led by the Prosecution in its totality to a maximum evaluation. Carefully scrutinize the credibility of each of the Prosecution’s
Page 10

(ii)
(iii) (iv) (v)
witnesses. Take into account all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. If the evidence admits two or more inferences, then draw the inference that is most favourable to the accused;
ask yourself the question, IF I now call upon the accused to make his defence and he elects to remain silent am I prepared to convict him on the evidence now before me? If the answer to that question is “YES” the defence should be called. If the answer is “NO” then, a prima facie case has not been made out and the accused should be acquitted;
After the defence is called, the accused elects to remain silent, then convict; After defence is called, the accused elect to
give evidence, then go through the steps set out in Mat v.PP (1993) 1 MLRH 400,; (1963) MLJ 263

Begitu juga di dalam kes Pendakwa Raya v Muhammad Fauzan Bin Md. Said [2017] MLJU 09 [TAB H] Yang Arif DATO’ HJ. MOHAMAD SHARIFF BIN HJ. ABU SAMAH, Public Prosecutor v Sidek bin Abdullah [2006] 3 MLJ 357 [TAB D] Yang Arif Mohd Hishamuddin, Public Prosecutor v Ng Chong Chin [2017] MLJU 33 [TAB I] , Public Prosecutor v Siti Nurhidayah [2017] MLJU 35 [TAB J] Tuan Collin Lawrence Sequerah JC membuat pendekatan yang sama.

C- Puan Majistret Yang Bijaksana,

Bagi elemen pertama bagi menepati standard prima facie iaitu “credible evidence”.
SP1, SP2 dan SP3 bukanlah saksi mata (eye-witness) kepada kemalangan ini. Hanya SP4 iaitu pengadu (XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX) yang menjadi saksi mata dalam kes kemalangan ini selain OKS.

Beliau membuat laporan polis P2.
Kewujudan ‘signboard’ yang tercabut dari keterangan SP4 menunjukkan bahawa kemalangan berlaku di mulut simpang menghala ke MS Garden Hotel. Begitu juga keterangan SP3 sendiri bahawa ‘tempat kemalangan adalah simpang masuk Hotel MS Garden.’ SP4 di dalam pemeriksaan balas menjawab seperti berikut tentang ‘point of impact’:

– Ya di “Y”.

– “Y” yang betul.

– Setuju di “Y” bukan di “X”.

Bukan ini sahaja yang ditunjukkan dalam pemeriksaan balas bahkan dalam pemeriksaan utama SP4 sendiri berkata begini:
– Di mana tempat berlaku kemalangan?

– Simpang masuk MS Garden.

PENTING: Di dalam pemeriksaan utama SP4 telah memberi keterangan bahawa kemalangan berlaku di “X”. Di dalam pemeriksaan balas beliau menyatakan “X” adalah satu jarak yang beliau “tidak pasti berapa jauh dari mulut simpang menghala ke Hotel MS Garden”. Beliau juga memberi keterangan bahawa kemalangan adalah berlaku di “Y”, ketika dicadangkan dalam soal balas. Kedudukan “Y” adalah betul-betul di mulut simpang menghala ke Hotel MS Garden.

Ini menunjukkan bahawa wujud kontradiksi. Kontradiksi merupakan satu percanggahan keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa SP4 saksi yang incredible menurut sub-seksyen (4) Seksyen 180.

Kami merujuk kepada kes NG (Tunisia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] All ER (D) 12 (Dec) [2010] EWCA Civ 1584 [TAB F] Court of Appeal, Civil Division�Rix, Carnwath and Stanley Burnton LJJ (judgment delivered extempore) mengesahkan keputusan Hakim Imigresen yang memutuskan:

“The immigration judge rejected his claim on the basis that he was an incredible witness.”

“The designated immigration judge had remarked that he was to consider the application afresh and no party had disagreed with that at the time and the hearing had continued on that basis. Had the reconsideration proceeded on the basis that only the two errors of law contained in the order were being addressed, it would have been unnecessary and inappropriate for the claimant to have given evidence or sought to prove his credibility.”

Kami merujuk kepada kes Sha’Ari Bin A. Samat v Public Prosecutor [2017] MLJU 05 [TAB G] HIGH COURT (JOHOR BAHRU)�YA TUAN COLLIN LAWRENCE SEQUERAH, JC memutuskan:

[29] In the case of Periasamy a/l Sinnapan & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 MLJ 557, Gopal Sri Ram JCA, (as His Lordship then was) had this to say :
In the state of the law, what was the duty and function of the learned judge on appeal? His duty and function have been the subject of discussion in a great many cases and for purposes we find it sufficient to refer to two of these.

In Lim Kheak Teong v PP [1985] 1 MLJ 38, the sessions court acquitted the accused on two charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1961, after having heard his defence. On appeal, the High Court set aside the order of acquittal and substituted therefor an order of conviction. The accused applied under the now repealed s 66 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 to reserve a question of law. In allowing the application and quashing the conviction, the Federal Court, whose judgment was delivered by Hashim Yeop Sani FJ (later CJ, Malaya) said (at pp 39-40) :
… we gave leave because firstly we felt that there was no proper appraisal of Sheo Swarup v King-Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227 and secondly purporting to follow Terrell Ag CJ in R v Low Toh Cheng [1941] MLJ 1, the appellate judge went into conflict with the trend of authorities in similar jurisdictions.

With respect, what Lord Russell of Killowen said in Sheo Swarup was that although no limitations should be placed on the power of the appellate court, in exercising the power conferred ‘the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters’ as :
. (1) the views of the trial judge on the credibility of the witnesses; �

. (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused; �

. (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and �

. (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had �the advantage of seeing the witnesses. �

Lord Reid reiterated this same principle in Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] AC 370 at p 375 where he quoted from Lord Thankerton’s judgment in Watt(or Thomas) v Thomas [1947] 1 All ER 582 that :
‘Where a question of fact has been tried by a judge without a jury, and there is no question of misdirection of himself by the judge, an appellate court which is disposed to come to a different conclusion on the printed evidence, should not do so unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, could not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial judge’s conclusion.’

The learned appellate judge held that the learned President had ‘misdirected himself on the explanation of the accused.’ Given the facts as stated in the appeal record, can it be said that there was a misdirection? Or can it be said that the decision of the learned President was ‘plainly unsound’? (Watt(or Thomas) v Thomas ). On the facts of this case we do not think so. (Emphasis added)

Kami merujuk kepada kes Pendakwa Raya lwn Jiang Haiyan (W/China) [2016] 9 MLJ 133 [TAB E] MAHKAMAH TINGGI (SHAH ALAM) ZULKIFLI BAKAR H memutuskan bahawa:-

[43] Pada pandangan mahkamah ini, kredibiliti SP1 dan SP3 adalah boleh disangsikan dan diragui serta keterangan mereka tidak wajar diterima sepenuhnya. Rujukan dibuat kepada kes Edmon John v Public Prosecutor [2014] 1 LNS 332 yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan seperti berikut:

[22] In accepting some and rejecting some other parts of the evidence of the witnesses, we found that this was purely an exercise of judicial function and discretion. The learned trial judge had noted the following in assessing the evidence of these two witnesses:

Oleh sebab itu mahkamah perlu lebih berhati-hati dalam menimbang keterangan mereka dalam menentukan bahagian mana keterangan mereka yang boleh diterima dan bahagian mana yang tidak boleh diterima. (Page 296 Record of Appeal Jilid III)

[23] The credibility of a witness is primarily a matter for the trial judge. When a judge who has seen and heard a witness and makes a conclusion with regard to what weight to be attached, that judgment is entitled to great respect (Clarke v Edinburgh Tramways Co 1919 SC (HL) 35, Lee Ah Seng & Anor v Public Prosecutor [2007] 6 MLJ 1; [2007] 5 CLJ 1). A court is fully competent for good and cogent reasons, to accept one part of the testimony of a witness and to reject the other (Public Prosecutor v Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 116; [1976] 1 LNS 180, Herchun Singh & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1969] 2 MLJ 209; [1969] 1 LNS 52, Dato Mokhtar Hashim & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1983] 2 MLJ 232; [1983] 2 CLJ 10). Even if a witness is found to be lying on one or two points that does not entitle the court to reject the whole of his evidence. As a matter of prudence his evidence must be treated and scrutinised with great care and indeed suspicion (Khoon Chye Hin v Public Prosecutor [1961] 1 MLJ 105; [1961] 1 LNS 41;).

[24] We at the appellate stage will not readily interfere with the findings of facts arrived at by the court of first instance to which the law entrusts the primary task of evaluating the evidence (Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd v Fortune Wealth (H-K) Ltd and other appeals [2004] 4 MLJ 105; [2004] 4 CLJ 282).

[25] The principles of law governing appeals in criminal cases are well established especially on finding of facts involving the evaluation of evidence founded on the credibility of the witness (Lai Kim Hon & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1982] 1 MLJ 84; [1980] 1 LNS 197, Sheo Swarup v King-Emperor (1934) 78 Sol Jo 600; AIR 1934 PC 227).

2016 9 MLJ 133 at 150

[26] In the instant appeal, having pursued the appeal records and the judgment of the learned trial judge, we found that His Lordship had carefully analysed all the available evidence before the court before making specific findings of fact founded on the credibility of the witnesses. His Lordship had considered the conflicting evidence of the two prosecution witnesses in the persons of PW5 and PW7 and had undertaken the process of evaluating and discounting certain parts of their evidence. Quoting the words of the learned trial judge, His Lordship as we have stated earlier, had even warned himself to be ‘lebih berhati-hati dalam menimbang keterangan mereka’. The learned trial judge is seized with the power to do so and we found he had rightly done so. We will not interfere’.

Oleh itu atas dasar ini sahaja pihak Pendakwa Raya gagal mematuhi peruntukan prima facie di bawah Seksyen 180 Akta 593. Atas alasan ini maka OKS tidak perlu dipanggil untuk membela diri dan beliau seharusnya dilepas dan dibebaskan.

D- Puan Majistret Yang Bijaksana,

Elemen kedua di bawah sub-seksyen (4) Seksyen 180 adalah “each ingredient of the offence”. Seperti yang kami sebut di awal penghujahan bahawa OKS sepatutnya di dakwa di bawah Kaedah 8(2) LN 166/59 yang berbunyi “At an intersection where the road is marked into 2 traffic lanes, the nearside lane shall be used only for vehicles turning left or travelling straight ahead, and the offside lane shall be used only for vehicles turning right.” Dengan mendakwanya di bawah Kaedah 8(1) LN 166/59 yang berbunyi “At an intersection where the road is marked into 3 traffic lanes, the nearside lane shall be used only by vehicles turning left, the centre lane shall be used only by vehicles travelling straight ahead, and the offside lane shall be used only by vehicles turning right.” maka pihak Pendakwa Raya harus membuktikan bahawa wujud 3 lorong pada tempat kejadian berkenaan yang mana ini gagal dibuktikan di akhir peringkat pendakwaan. Adalah dikehendaki di bawah sub-seksyen (4) Seksyen 180 bahawa setiap ramuan (ingredient) kesalahan harus dibuktikan bagi mematuhi dan menepati strandard prima facie. Jika tidak OKS harus dilepas dan dibebaskan. Ini lah penghujahan kami yang mana pihak Pendakwa Raya gagal membuktikan wujudnya 3 lorong seperti mana yang di dakwa. Ini adalah memprejudiskan OKS bahkan satu kemestian bagi pihak Pendakwa Raya membuktikan wujudnya 3 lorong di tempat kemalangan.

SP4 juga gagal mengenalpasti kenderaan OKS “bilakah pada kali pertama beliau melihatnya” (pemeriksaan balas). Oleh itu bagaimana SP4 tahu bahawa kenderaan OKS dari arah lorong A1-A2? Oleh itu pihak Pendakwa Raya gagal membuktikan ramuan (ingredient) bagi kesalahan Kaedah 8(1). Bahkan sepatutnya OKS di dakwa di atas Kaedah 8(2) kerana tempat berkenaan mempunyai 2 lorong. Elemen kedua ini bukan setakat gagal dibuktikan semasa pendakwaan tetapi juga tiada keterangan konsisten dari SP4 yang merupakan orang yang terlibat dalam kemalangan.

SP3 iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat sendiri memberi keterangan bahawa di tempat kejadian mempunyai 2 lorong ketika ketika dia ditanya dalam pemeriksaan utama. Ini disokong oleh P5 dan P5(k) yang mana lorong kiri sebagai A1-A2 dan lorong kanan A2-A3.

Di dalam P1 iaitu laporan pertama (FIR) kemalangan ini OKS menyatakan ‘saya berada di lorong paling kanan semasa saya hendak membelok ke kanan tiba-tiba sebuah m/kar no. XXX XXXX dari arah belakang memintas sebelah kanan saya dan melanggar pada bahagian depan sisi kanan’.

Repot ini (P1) dibuat dalam masa 1 jam kemalangan berlaku. Adalah mustahil beliau mereka-cipta keterangan seperti dalam laporan polisnya.

E- Puan Majistret Yang Bijaksana,

Elemen ketiga di bawah sub-seksyen (4) Seksyen 180 adalah “if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction”. Tiada apa yang perlu disangkal (rebut) atau diterangkan (explain) oleh OKS kerana SP4 “tidak pasti pada kali pertama dia melihat kenderaan OKS”. Oleh itu adalah satu yang tidak lojik bahawa SP4 tahu kenderaan OKS adalah dari lorong yang bertentangan.

Kerosakan-kerosakan kenderan jelas menunjukkan kemalangan berlaku ketika kenderaan OKS sedang membelok masuk simpang. SP3 sendiri memberi keterangan bahawa kenderaan SP4 yang melanggar kenderaan OKS. ‘Point of impact’ iaitu di “Y” jelas menunjukkan kemalangan ini berlaku ketika kenderaan OKS sedang masuk simpang. Oleh itu adalah tidak lojik kenderaan OKS dari lorong sebelah kiri.

Tambahan lagi kami berhujah bahawa ketiga-tiga elemen yang dibentangkan di bawah sub-seksyen (4) Seksyen 180 iaitu (1) credible evidence (2) proving each ingredient of the offence (3) if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction seharusnya dibaca secara “serentak” (contemproneously) bukannya “terasing” (disjunctively).

PENUTUP

Oleh itu kami berhujah bahawa pihak Pendakwa Raya gagal mematuhi kehendak statut di bawah sub-seksyen (4) Seksyen 180 Akta 593. Dengan itu OKS harus dilepas dan dibebaskan.

Bertarikh 8hb. April, 2017.

……………………………….

Peguambela OKS

TETUAN ROHAN & CO

PENGHUJAHAN BERTULIS ORANG KENA SAMAN ini difailkan oleh TETUAN ROHAN & CO. yang mempunyai alamat penyampaian di No. 55-C, Jalan SG 3/10, Pusat Bandar Sri Gombak, 68100 Batu Caves, Selangor Darul Ehsan. Tel: 01118914129 Fax: 0321784892 Email: rohanrazi@gmail.com RUJ: ROHANCO/XXXXXX/2016.

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